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I. LEGISLATION
Oil Spill Prevention and Response Act-Act No. 7 of the First
Extraordinary Session of 1991, the Oil Spill Prevention and Response
Act, enacts Chapter 19 of Subtitle II of Title 30 (Louisiana Revised
Statutes 30:2451-2496) and Louisiana Revised Statutes 36:4(M). It pro-
vides for oil spill prevention and response in certain waters of the
state, for liability for removal costs, and for damages for oil spills.
It also makes provision for responder immunity, for enforcement and
adjudication, and for penalties. The Act creates the Oil Spill Contin-
gency Fund and establishes the office of the Louisiana oil spill co-
ordinator together with the powers, duties and functions of that office.
In addition, it creates an interagency council composed of certain
members appointed by designated legislators and specified state agency
officials.
Abandoned Waste Sites-Act No. 352 enacts Louisiana Revised
Statutes 30:79, relative to abandoned oilfield waste sites. It requires
recordation of notice of abandoned oilfield waste sites by the land-
owner. Failure of a landowner to file the required notice may constitute
grounds for an action in redhibition under the applicable provisions
of Louisiana Civil Code articles 2520 et seq. unless the subsequent
purchaser has actual or constructive knowledge that the property has
been used for such purposes. The notice may be removed upon a
finding by the Commissioner of Conservation that the oilfield waste
no longer poses a potential threat to health or the environment.
Unit Well Costs-Act No. 595 amends and reenacts Louisiana
Revised Statutes 30:10(A)(2)(c) and (d). It provides a specific method
of calculating cost of production for purposes of allocating certain
interests. If a well has already been drilled or is being drilled when
the risk provisions of the act become applicable, the cost of drilling,
testing, completing, equipping, and operating the well allocable to each
tract included in the unit shall be reduced in the same proportion as
the recoverable reserves in the unitized pool recovered by prior pro-
Copyright 1992, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
Campanile Professor of Mineral Law, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana
State University.
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
duction, if any, in which the tract did not participate prior to deter-
mining the share of cost allocable to the tract. Similarly, if a unit is
revised so as to include an additional tract, the costs will be likewise
reduced proportionately for that additional tract. Thus such osts are
to be reduced on a proportional basis rather than a dollar-for-dollar
basis. The amendment was apparently prompted by recent rulings of
the Commissioner of Conservation pursuant to application of the 1984
revisions of Section 10 of Title 30.
Produced Water Injection Incentives-Act No. 625 enacts Louisiana
Revised Statutes 47:633.5 to provide an incentive for injection of water
produced from oil and gas operations back into an oil and gas reservoir.
It allows a deduction from the severance tax on oil and gas produced
from enhanced recovery utilizing produced water as a driving mech-
anism.
Regulatory Codes-Act No. 735 enacts Louisiana Revised Statutes
49:954.2 and 954.3 to provide for the creation of an Environmental
Regulatory Code and for a Unified Oil and Gas Regulation Code. The
Act provides for the powers and duties of the secretary of the De-
partment of Natural Resources for the creation of such code. Rules
or regulations that are not timely submitted for codification are unen-
forceable against applicants for oil and gas development related permits
after a certain date.
Inspection Fee Exemptions-Act No. 778 amends and reenacts
Section 1 of Louisiana Revised Statutes 30:21 to provide as follows:
B. There shall be no fee imposed for the inspection, mon-
itoring, or regulatory maintenance of stripper crude oil wells
or incapable gas wells certified pursuant to R.S. 47:633 on
January I of each year by the Severance Tax Division of the
Department of Revenue and Taxation.
Act No. 811 amends and reenacts Section 1 of Louisiana Revised
Statutes 30:21 to provide as follows:
B. Nothing contained herein shall authorize the charging
of inspection fees for shut-in oil wells or temporarily abandoned
oil wells in stripper fields.
It can probably be assumed that the legislature intended for both of
these Acts to be effective. But they result in two different versions of
the same section.
State Lease Pugh Clause-Act No. 786 amends and reenacts Louis-
iana Revised Statutes 30:129(B) to provide that each lease entered into
by the Mineral Board after August 1, 1991 shall contain a "Pugh
clause." Such a clause shall provide that the commencement of op-
erations for the drilling of a well, the conducting of reworking op-
erations, or the production of minerals on any portion of a unit which
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embraces all or any part of the property covered by such lease shall
maintain the lease in effect under the terms of the lease only as to
the part of the leased property embraced by the unit. The clause may
provide that the acreage outside the unit(s) may be maintained by any
means covered by the lease, but if by rental payments, then such
payment may be reduced proportionately to the amount of acreage
included in the unit as it bears to the total acreage in the lease,
provided that the rental per acre on the outside acreage shall not be
less than one-half of the cash payment paid for the lease per acre nor
shall the lease on the non-unitized acreage be extended more than two
years beyond the primary term.
Expedited Permits-Act No. 828 amends and reenacts Louisiana
Revised Statutes 30:26 and 2022(C), 49:214.30(C)(2), and 56:6(26), and
enacts Louisiana Revised Statutes 49:962.1 to provide for the expedited
consideration of certain oil and gas and pipeline permits. The Act
requires the Department of Natural Resources, the Department of
Environmental Quality and the Department of Wildlife and Fisheries
to grant or deny applications for permits, licenses, registrations, var-
iances, or compliance relating to oil and gas wells and pipelines within
sixty days. Should a permit not be granted or denied within the specified
time, the statute gives the applicant the authority, on motion in a
court of competent jurisdiction, to take a rule to show cause in not
less than two nor more than thirty days why the applicant should not
be granted the permit, license, registration, variance, or compliance
schedule for which the applicant had applied.
Water Bottom Obstruction Clearance-Act No. 957 enacts Louis-
iana Revised Statutes 30:4(J). Under this, the Commissioner of Con-
servation is to adopt rules no later than January 1, 1992 to require
that the owners of all abandoned well and platform locations on state
water bottoms in the Gulf of Mexico and adjacent bays and inlets
clear them of all related obstructions. The rules are to provide that
such clearance be verified at the cost of such owner. The clearance
and verification requirements and procedures are to be substantially
the same as those required by the United States Department of the
Interior Minerals Management Service for abandoned oil and gas struc-
tures in the Gulf of Mexico.
II. STATE AND FEDERAL LANDS
A. A River Shifts Course-The "Freeze Statute"
State ownership of water bottoms promises to be a fruitful area
for lawsuits for years to come. One should expect, if not a flood of
litigation, at least a steady stream of cases. Such litigation in years
19921
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past led the Louisiana legislature to enact the so-called "Freeze Statute,"'
but its application has itself led to legal controversy. One such recent
case involving both the interpretation of the "Freeze Statute" and of
a state lease was Cities Service Oil and Gas Corp. v. State.' The case
arose due to a shift in the bed of the Red River between 1972 and
1979. The river in part moved from Bossier Parish to Caddo Parish
until its movement was halted by the Army Corps of Engineers, but
the Corps' rescue did not come in time for some owners. The suit
was filed as a concursus proceeding to determine ownership of revenues
produced from a unit established by the Commissioner of Conservation
that included riverbed land leased by the state. Seven different groups
of litigants claimed an interest in the proceeds from unit production,
including the state of Louisiana, the state's lessee under a 1972 lease
of the riverbed, the unit operators and several groups of landowners
and their lessees. Some leases were recorded in Caddo Parish and some
were recorded in both Caddo and Bossier Parishes.
As to the state's lessee, the trial court held that the state lease
did not move westward with the river. The appellate court agreed,
holding that the state lease remained with the former riverbed and did
not move to the new bed. The lease stated that it covered land "now
or formerly" constituting the riverbed owned by the state on a specific
date, September 1, 1972.' It did not provide that the lease would follow
the movement of the river. This holding may pose substantial problems
for lessees of state lands, causing them to lose valuable mineral rights
that they have developed in reliance on a state lease. Moreover, some
units created by voluntary or compulsory pooling may come into ques-
tion should the state insist that lease rights have been lost due to the
shift in a river bed.
For one group whose leases were recorded only in Caddo Parish,
the trial court found that their leases did not affect Bossier Parish
property as to third persons when the river moved to the adjacent
parish. As a consequence of this application of the public records
doctrine, when the two other groups acquired the property east of the
river as the river moved westward, their acquisitions were in full
ownership up to the Bossier Parish line (except for the former riverbed
which was covered by State Lease 6002). The appellate court affirmed
the result, but observed that "inasmuch as the leases at issue expired
i. La. R.S. 9:1151 (1991).
2. 574 So. 2d 455 (La. App. 2d Cir.), wri" denied, 578 So. 2d 132, 136 (1991).
3. The state lease covered the following: "All the lands now or formerly consti-
tuting the beds and bottoms of all water bodies of every nature and description and
all islands and other lands formed by accretion or reliction, except tax lands, owned
by and not under mineral lease from the State of Louisiana on September I, 1972,
situated in Bossier and Caddo Parishes .. " Id. at 458.
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prior to the drilling of the unit well, the issue of whether they were
recorded in Bossier Parish [was] of no importance." '4
The trial court found that the Freeze Statute only applied where:
(1) ownership of the land changed as a result of the movement of the
river; and (2) an oil and gas lease existed on the newly acquired land,
under the terms of which the former owners, lessors, lessees, royalty
owners and mineral owners had already acquired rights. In the absence
of a lease, the land acquired by accretion came to the new owner in
full ownership. However, if the land was acquired subject to a lease,
the rights of the lessees and lessors were protected only for as long
as the lease continued to be in effect. Upon expiration of the lease,
all mineral rights reverted to the new owner who had acquired the
surface of the property by accretion.
Applying this interpretation to the facts before it, the trial court
determined that upon the expiration of a 1974 lease in 1978 the mineral
rights of these lessors in the new riverbed expired. Since that time,
the state had owned the new riverbed free of this lease. The expiration
of the 1974 lease in 1978 also allowed two other groups to acquire
the Caddo Parish property east of the new riverbed in full ownership.
The court of appeal rejected a claim that the application of the
statute results in an unconstitutional taking of the riparian landowners'
rights to acquire future alluvion, a vested right. Applying Jones v.
Hogue,' the court of appeal held "that ownership of alluvion is not
a vested right, but a legislative donation which may be altered or
controlled by the legislature." 6
Under the Freeze Statute, outstanding mineral rights are not af-
fected by a change in ownership of navigable water bottoms. The
statute applies only when there is a change of ownership of land or
water bottoms caused by the action of a navigable stream and there
is in effect a mineral lease covering and affecting the lands or water
bottoms. However, the statute does not require that there be actual
mineral production from the leased land in order for the statute to
be effective. The statute does not establish imprescriptible mineral
rights.'
B. Alluvial Deposits
In Davis Oil Co. v. Citrus Land Co.,' Davis Oil obtained mineral
leases from both the State of Louisiana and Citrus Land which pur-
4. Id.
5. 241 La. 407, 129 So. 2d 194 (1960).
6. 574 So. 2d at 460-61.
7. La. R.S. 9:1152, "which specifically grants an imprescriptible mineral servitude
to an agency or political subdivision of the State, if the state acquires the land of the
agency or political subdivision as a result of the movement of a navigable water body,
does not 'supplement' the Freeze Statute, La. R.S. 9:1151." 574 So. 2d at 463.
8. 576 So. 2d 495 (La. 1991).
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ported to cover the same alluvion. Proceeds attributable to the royalty
interest owed to the owner of the alluvion were deposited in the registry
of the court and placed in escrow pending title determination as to
the alluvion. Unable to reach agreement with the lessors, Davis filed
this concursus proceeding.
The alluvion in dispute was an area formed near the mouth of
Shell Island Pass (a river), where the Pass intersects with Little Bay,
which is itself an extension of Atchafalaya Bay. The formation of the
alluvion was rather unique because the extension of the right descending
bank of Shell Island Pass into Little Bay was not mirrored on the
left descending bank side of the Pass. The trial court ruled that Citrus
Land owned the disputed alluvion, reasoning that a statute effective
July 12, 1974 was an implicit legislative recognition that the area in
question was not an "arm of the sea" prior to the effective date. 9 In
effect, the trial court held that by July 12, 1974, the mouth of Shell
Island Pass had been extended into Little Bay due to alluvial buildup.
Thus, the court ruled that the entire disputed tract fell north of the
line described in the statute and was, therefore, owned by Citrus, the
riparian landowner. The court of appeal then reversed the trial court, 10
holding that even before the effective date of the statute, the area in
question was an arm of the sea and, as seashore was a public thing,
was insusceptible of private ownership. Where a riverbank intersects
the seashore, the seashore must prevail, said the court of appeal." The
Louisiana Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded. It agreed
with the court of appeal that the 1974 statute was not a legislative
determination that the area was not an arm of the sea prior to July
12, 1974. Moreover, even if it was not an arm of the sea, the area
(Little Bay) may have been a lake or a bay and, as such, alluvion
forming along its shore would belong to the state.'2
The court succinctly set forth the pertinent legal principles as
follows:
Alluvion which forms along the bank of a river or a stream
belongs to the owner of the land adjacent to the bank. Alluvion
which forms along the shore of a body of water that is not
a river or a stream belongs to the State. . . .Thus, to determine
the ownership of alluvion, a court must first determine the
bank or shore upon which it has accumulated, and then it
must classify the area upon which the alluvion accumulated as
either the bank of a river/stream or the shore of a lake, bay,
9. La. R.S. 38:2356(M)(1) (1989).
10. Davis Oil Co. v. Citrus Land Co., 563 So. 2d 401 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1990).
11. Id. at 405.
12. State v. Placid Oil Co., 300 So. 2d 154 (La. 1974).
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or arm of the sea .... [Hiow the alluvion itself is classified
is irrelevant; the pertinent inquiry is where the alluvion ac-
cumulated. In this case, consequently, it simply does not matter
whether or not the alluvion has become an extension of the
right descending bank of Shell Island Pass.'"
The court of appeal implicitly found that Little Bay was either
part of the sea or an arm of the sea. That court overlooked, however,
the principal issue-at what point did the riverbank and the seashore
intersect prior to the buildup of the alluvion in dispute. Thus, the
supreme court remanded for a new trial on the issue of whether the
alluvion formed along the former shoreline of Little Bay, along the
right descending bank of Shell Island Pass, or partly on the bank of
Shell Island Pass and partly on the former shoreline of Little Bay.
The court observed that to answer this question, the trial court would
have to make a factual determination on the location of the point
where the right descending bank of Shell Island Pass intersects with
the former shoreline of Little Bay. If the trial court were to find that
the alluvion formed partly along the bank of Shell Island Pass and
partly along the former shoreline of Little Bay, the court must then
determine whether Louisiana Civil Code article 501 4 or its underlying
principle should be applied.
C. Outer Continental Shelf Lands-A Platform for Louisiana
Property Law
Shell sold Platform D, an oil well platform on the Outer Conti-
nental Shelf, to Kirby. The. platform had a pipeline that ran from it
to Shell's Platform C and then beyond. Shell later gave up the federal
oil and gas lease on the block where Platform C was located. Even
though this lease terminated, Shell remained responsible to the federal
government for the platform and pipeline until removed. Shell asked
Kirby to remove the pipeline from Platform C, contending that when
Shell sold Platform D to Kirby this resulted under Louisiana law in
a predial servitude on Platform C in favor of Kirby's Platform D,
and moreover, that under Louisiana law Shell could abandon the
13. Citing La. Civ. Code art. 499, 500; Placid Oil, 300 So. 2d 154; Amerada
Petroleum Corp. v. State Mineral Bd., 203 La. 473, 14 So. 2d 61 (1943); Miami Corp.
v. State, 186 La. 784, 173 So. 315 (1936); State v. Erwin, 173 La. 507, 138 So. 84
(1931).
14. La. Civ. Code art. 501 provides: "Alluvion formed in front of property of
several owners is divided equitably, taking into account the extent of the front of each
property prior to the formation of the alluvion in issue. Each owner is entitled to a
fair proportion of the area of the alluvion and a fair proportion of the new frontage
on the river, depending on the relative values of the frontage and the acreage."
199 2l
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
servient estate to Kirby, the owner of the dominant estate, and that
Kirby was bound to accept it. Kirby refused, and Shell brought suit
in Shell Offshore, Inc. v. Kirby Exploration Co. of Texas," seeking
a declaration that Kirby owned Platform C, or, in the alternative, that
Kirby was responsible for maintaining and ultimately removing the
platform. The district court ruled that abandonment was not an option
available to Shell, as Shell could not have granted a predial servitude
on Platform C to Kirby; the court ordered Kirby to move its pipeline,
finding that nothing in the sale of Platform D to Kirby gave Kirby
the right to support its pipeline on C. Both parties appealed. The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. The court recognized
that the law of Louisiana applied to the dispute, except to the extent
that it is inconsistent with federal law.'6 Analyzing the Louisiana Civil
Code, the court said that "fwJhen Shell sold Platform D to Kirby,
assuming the existence of the other requisites of the charge, an apparent
predial servitude of passage or support would come into existence in
favor of Kirby."'" The court continued, however, that while such a
servitude could be abandoned, this conflicted with federal law as the
United States lease and regulations did not permit abandonment of
the Platform C by Shell. The absence of abandonment converted the
charge from one on an estate to one resembling a personal obligation.
Further, the court found Kirby expected to use the pipeline in the
future under the same conditions existing when Kirby bought it. There
were equities with both Kirby and Shell as to who should be responsible
for the pipeline, so the court remanded to the district court "to explore
the customs and practices in the offshore oil and gas industry in dealing
with the type of problem presented in this case. ' "'
D. Royalty Payment on NGPA Reimbursement Payments
. Pursuant to section 110 of the Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA),
the Minerals Management Service (MMS) of the United States De-
partment of the Interior ordered Mesa Operating Limited Partnership
(Mesa) to pay royalties on reimbursement payments made to Mesa by
pipeline company purchasers who had purchased gas from Mesa. 9 The
Department of the Interior (DOI) affirmed the MMS demand order.
Mesa appealed the DOI's decision to federal district court, contending
15. 909 F.2d 811 (5th Cir. 1990).
16. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act declares that the law of the adjacent
state applies to the outer continental shelf, except insofar as it conflicts with that Act
itself, or other federal laws or regulations. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2)(A) (1988).
17. 909 F.2d at 814.
18. Id. at 816.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 3320(a) (1988).
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that the DOI misinterpreted regulations governing assessment of roy-
alties. The district court rejected Mesa's arguments and entered sum.-
mary judgment in favor of the DOI. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed in Mesa Operating Ltd. Partnership v.
United States Department of Interior,20 holding that the DOI, in af-
firming the MMS order, made a permissible interpretation of the federal
regulations that govern royalties owing from federal natural gas leases.
III. CONVEYANCINO
A. Correction Deed
The case of Bourgeois v. Landry" was an appeal from a trial court
decision that an instrument in controversy was not a correction in-
strument, a sale, or a compromise and was thus to be considered a
nullity. The court of appeal reversed. The plaintiffs and defendant
had, together with other consideration, exchanged land in two parishes.
Bourgeois, a plaintiff, was to give Landry 74+ acres he owned, which
had been part of a larger tract, in exchange for 18 acres and other
consideration. The larger tract was subject to a mineral servitude that
was about to prescribe for nonuse at the time of the transaction.
Bourgeois had a 3/40ths interest in the servitude which covered 3,720
acres. Landry was to receive all the minerals in the 74+ acres. Pre..
scription was interrupted by the recordation of a Reinscription of
Mineral Interest and an Act Interrupting the Running of Prescription
filed before the ten year prescriptive period had expired. The exchange
took place and Landry received only a 3/40ths interest in the 74+
acre tract. Subsequently Bourgeois executed the "Correction Deed"
purporting to give Landry a mineral interest in the servitude covering
the 3,720 acre tract to compensate for the failure to convey to Landry
the full mineral rights in the 74+ acre tract; it was this instrument
that the trial court found was a nullity. The Louisiana Third Circuit
Court of Appeal here reversed based on manifest error as to the intent
of the parties in the confection of the "Correction Deed." It declared
the conveyance valid and ordered it enforced according to its terms.
B. Necessity of a Writing for Conveyance of an Interest in a Well
The court of appeal in Crain v. Dork22 reviewed a trial court
judgment ordering specific performance of an oral agreement to transfer
20. 931 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1991).
21. 583 So. 2d 36 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991).
22. 578 So. 2d 555 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 581 So. 2d 694 (1991).
19921
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
an interest in an oil and gas well. The court reversed, holding that
the contract was unenforceable because it contemplated the oral transfer
of immovable property in violation of Louisiana Civil Code article
1839.23 The interest was a mineral interest, and a mineral interest is
an incorporeal immovable to which Article 1839 applies. Because the
portion of the oral agreement was unenforceable, the entire oral agree-
ment was unenforceable.
C. Third Party Good Faith Purchaser
Tupper sold mineral rights, less a 1/48th overriding royalty interest,
in a tract of land to CATL, an unregistered d/b/a for Palermo for
$8,000. CATL transferred 1/2 of the minerals in the tract to Reed,
and then Reed and CATL sold their entire mineral interest in the tract
to Dallas Oil for $160,000. In Tupper v. CATL Operating Co.,24 Tupper
sued CATL seeking rescission of the sale based on fraud, misrepre-
sentation, incapacity of the vendor, inadequacy of consideration, and
irregularities in the confection of the act of sale. She sought restoration
of all fruits and revenues, together with damages. The trial court
denied her motion for summary judgment and granted a motion for
summary judgment made by Dallas Oil, finding that Dallas Oil was
protected as a good-faith third party purchaser. Tupper appealed,
contending that there were genuine issues of fact as to the good faith
of Dallas Oil, relying on three facts: (1) the disparity between the
original sale price ($8000) and Dallas Oil's purchase price ($160,000);
(2) the absence of a recorded mandate showing LeBlanc's (CATL's
agent) authority to act on behalf of CATL; and, (3) the absence of
a certificate of public record setting forth CATL as the d/b/a for
Palermo. The court of appeal affirmed. Noting that the Mineral Code
specifically provides that the sale of a mineral right is not subject to
lesion beyond moiety, 2 the court stated that consideration for a trans-
action involving the sale of mineral rights is speculative in character.
Thus, the court could not impute bad faith to Dallas Oil solely on
the basis of the price disparity. While the Louisiana statutes prohibit
business transactions under assumed names, this did not vitiate either
23. Article 1839 provides as follows:
A transfer of immovable property must be made by authentic act or by
act under private signature. Nevertheless, an oral transfer is valid between
the parties when the property has been actually delivered and the transferor
recognizes the transfer when interrogated on oath. An instrument involving
immovable property shall have effect against third persons only from the time
it is filed for registry in the parish where the property is located.
La. Civ. Code art. 1839.
24. 580 So. 2d 1050 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991).
25. La. R.S. 31:17 (1989).
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CATL's contract with Tupper or CATL's contract with Dallas Oil.
Likewise the court found no merit to Tupper's contention that the
absence of a recorded procuration between Palermo/CATL and LeBlanc
rendered Dallas Oil in bad faith.
IV. CONTRACT INTERPRETATION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
A. AMI Farmout Interpreted as Optional
Petrocana sought, in the case of Petrocana, Inc. v. Margo, Inc. ,'26
to enforce a letter agreement (a farmout) of July 9, 1981 establishing
an area of mutual interest (AMI). Under the agreement Margo, Inc.
paid Petrocana $50,000 for the right to drill a well on certain Petrocana
lease acreage; if the well was a commercial producer, Margo was to
earn an assignment of the working interest in the acreage. Margo was
given geological information by Petrocana to assist in the drilling of
the well. Margo did not drill the test well, and subsequent to January
1, 1982 Margo acquired a mineral lease in the AMI acreage. Petrocana
sought to be recognized as owner of a 5% overriding royalty interest
in any mineral leases acquired by the defendants within the AMI since
the date of the letter agreement and also sought damages for the
"misappropriation and utilization" of the geological information fur-
nished by Petrocana to the defendants. The district court granted
summary judgment to the defendants. On the plaintiff's appeal, the
third circuit court of appeal affirmed, holding that the letter agreement
terminated on January 1, 1982, and all rights thereunder were forfeited
when Margo, Inc. did not drill a test well; all rights under the letter
agreement were forfeited by the terms of the letter agreement, including
the purported area of mutual interest. The court rejected Petrocana's
contention that the AMI was extended beyond the termination date
of the letter agreement by a verbal agreement: "[It is clear that parol
evidence is inadmissible to prove the existence of an extension by
verbal agreement of the transfer of an interest in an immovable since
such an agreement would be invalid and unenforceable under Louisiana
law." ' 27 Likewise, the court rejected the claim that Petrocana was
entitled to damages for misuse of the geological information, stating
that the only consequence of failing to drill the test well was loss of
the right to earn the mineral leases. There was a dissent by Judge
Foret.
This decision represents one of the pitfalls of drafting farmout
agreements. To express one consequence of the failure to drill is to
26. 577 So. 2d 274 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991).
27. Id. at 278.
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run the risk that it will be regarded as the exclusive consequence. The
court reprints the letter agreement as an appendix to the opinion, and
it is clear that the court's characterization of the agreement as a farmout
is correct. The agreement states: "Failure by Margo to conduct the
required operations shall result in termination of this agreement and
forfeiture of all rights hereunder." 2 The trial court and appellate court
read this paragraph as providing the exclusive consequence of the failure
to drill the test well, making the test well an option of the farmer.
Yet, the agreement also provided that "[oin or before January 1, 1982,
at a mutually acceptable location, Margo, Inc., or assigns, shall com-
mence drilling a 12,300 ft. test well .... ,"29 The use of "shall" would
indicate the drilling was an obligation, as contended by Petrocana,
and, not merely a permissive right. As one authority has observed,
"[Tihe term 'farmout' is almost always reserved for agreements which
require at least one test well."3 0 Professor Lowe states that the "hall-
mark of an obligation well farmout is that the farmer will have a
binding legal obligation to drill on the farmed-out acreage."', The
court's treatment of the clause specifying termination for failure to
drill turned what looked like an obligation farmout into an option
farmout. Perhaps this is in accord with industry practice, for Lowe
goes on to state that "the vast majority of farmout agreements make
drilling an option rather than an obligation. '32
B. Who Earned Forfeited Right?
The case of Crescent Drilling & Development, Inc. v. Sealexco
Inc.3 was a concursus proceeding to determine the ownership of pro-
duction from several wells. It involved interpretation of a series of
transactions among the principals of Sealexco, a corporation formed
for the purpose of acquiring, selling, drilling and operating interests
in various oil and gas prospects. Sealexco entered a farmout agreement
with Tee Oil to earn interests in a certain mineral lease. Sealexco
entered into separate exploration agreements with Ben Seale (one of
the principals of Sealexco), with Crescent, and with Warren Knight.
The agreements specified the before casing point (BCP) and after casing
point (ACP) interests of the parties. Warren Knight forfeited his rights
28. Id. at 282.
29. Id. at 280.
30. Scott, How to Prepare an Oil and Gas Farmout Agreement, 33 Baylor L. Rev.
63, 67 (1981).
31. Lowe, Analyzing Oil and Gas Farmout Agreements, 41 Sw. L.J. 759, 782
(1987).
32. Id. at 792. See also Schaefer, The Ins and Outs of Farmouts: A Practical
Guide for the Landman and the Lawyer, 32 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 18-1, 18-16 (1986).
33. 570 So. 2d 151 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990), writ denied, 575 So. 2d 373 (1991).
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under his agreement, and the dispute concerned who among the Seal-
exco principals acquired those interests attributable to his forfeiture.
The court of appeal affirmed a trial court determination that Ben
Seale acquired the entire Knight-forfeited BCP interest and 75% of
that as additional ACP. As Sealexco was the beneficiary of any unsold
interest, a 3.25% ACP interest which remained reverted to Sealexco.
C. Reassignment Clause in Sublease Given Limited Effect
Avatar took a lease on 2067 acres of land with a primary term
of three years and sixty days. It then subleased the lease to Gulf
(Chevron's predecessor) under a contract in which Gulf agreed to pay
delay rentals and to reassign the lease in certain circumstances. Before
consummating the sublease to Gulf, Avatar assigned overriding royalty
to Moyers (Avatar's sole shareholder) and Jenkins (the independent
landman who negotiated the Avatar lease). A provision of the agree-
ment with Gulf explicitly burdened the assignment with the overrides
of Moyers and Jenkins. As the end of the primary term approached,
Gulf agreed with a company, which had taken a top lease from the
landowners, not to drill the lease obtained from Avatar in exchange
for that top lessee assigning the top lease to Gulf. The Avatar lease
thus expired and with it the overriding royalty of Moyers and Jenkins.
Avatar and Jenkins' assignee brought suit in Avatar Exploration, Inc.
v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.3 4 against Gulf/Chevron for breach of the
agreement under which the Avatar lease was assigned to Gulf.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that Gulf had not breached
the assignment agreement. The reassignment clause provided:
Assignor herein reserves the right to a re-assignment of the
leases assigned herein if Assignee elects not to pay any delay
rentals coming due. Such re-assignment shall be made within
sixty (60) days of the rental payment or expiration date."
Because Gulf had paid all necessary delay rentals, there was no
obligation to reassign the lease to Avatar. Despite the clear provision
relating to the expiration date of the lease, the court rejected Avatar's
argument that inclusion of the "or expiration date" language in the
clause evidenced an intent by the parties for Gulf to reassign the lease
if it chose not to pay delay rentals and to reassign prior to the end
of the primary term. The second sentence of the clause began with
the words "such reassignment" and described the time limits for reas-
signing the lease. By using the words "such reassignment," the second
sentence was limited in application to reassignment caused by the failure
34. 933 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1991).
35. Id. at 317.
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to pay delay rentals described in the first sentence. "Nothing in the
clause," the court said, "indicated an intent of the parties to expand
the right to reassignment beyond the occurrence of that one event."136
Thus, the condition required for a right to reassignment never occurred.
Although the royalty assignments from Avatar to Moyers and
Jenkins contained a "renewal and extension" clause (or anti-washout
clause),3" the court found that it was not binding on Gulf as Gulf was
not a party to it. Gulf had not assumed Avatar's obligations under
the royalty assignments to Moyers and Jenkins.
D. Accounting for Well Costs-Operator Not a Fiduciary
Caddo Oil was the operator of certain leases under an operating
agreement, and O'Brien was a non-operator with Caddo. Caddo charged
an operating expense as well as well costs to the non-operators. Between
June, 1979 and December, 1981, Caddo drilled and completed seven
additional wells on the leases. O'Brien refused to pay costs and expenses
on these wells though he did receive production revenues from the
wells. Caddo brought suit for damages for its costs and expenses in
Caddo Oil Co. v. O'Brien.3" The trial court gave judgment for Caddo
in the amounts set forth in the operating agreement but denied Caddo
additional amounts it claimed for increased expenses that were higher
than the rates in the operating agreement and also denied Caddo
recovery for the costs of the seven additional wells that O'Brien said
were drilled without his consent. Both Caddo and O'Brien appealed.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial
of increased expenses and the costs of drilling the additional wells.
The Fifth Circuit rejected O'Brien's contention that the operator owed
a fiduciary duty to the non-operator requiring the operator to provide
the non-operator with a full accounting for all expenditures. The court
stated: "Under the terms of the Operating Agreement, the Operator
is liable to the Owners only in cases of the Operator's willful mis-
conduct. The terms of the Operating Agreement control, and [the
operator's] actions are to be judged by a prudent operator standard,
not by that of a fiduciary." 39
36. Id. at 317-18.
37. "In the event Assignee secures an extension, correction or renewal of any lease
subject hereto prior to the termination of such lease ... or ... a new lease covering
any or all lands described in the leases subject hereto prior to the termination of such
leases or within one (I) year thereafter, then the overriding royalty interest reserved
herein shall attach to and burden such extension, renewal or new lease, and Assignee
... shall execute a recordable instrument evidencing the existence and effectiveness of
the overriding royalty." Id. at 318.
38. 908 F.2d 13 (5th Cir. 1990).
39. Id. at 17.
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E. Repayment of Loan from Well Proceeds Not Exclusive Manner
of Repayment
In Shell Offshore, Inc. v. Marr,10 Shell, Marr, and others entered
into a joint operating agreement for development of a gas field. Mar"
put up $3,000,000 for his share of drilling and operation costs. Shell
was unable to process all of the gas and was delayed in constructing
a gas processing plant. To resolve a dispute over Marr's contribution,
Shell advanced Marr $6,000,000 over a two year period under an
agreement that Marr was to pay back that amount from the proceeds
of one-half of his working interest -in specified wells, with Marr having
the option of extinguishing the debt in cash. After the market for gas
became depressed, Shell brought suit contending Marr had to pay the
amount in full and that Marr had repudiated the agreement. The district
court upheld Marr's position that the debt was to be paid only from
production (unless Marr elected to pay in cash). If Shell could not
recoup the money from production, the loss was to be borne by it
alone under the agreement. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.
The court said that while Shell and Marr fully expected the indebtedness
to be repaid from one-half of Marr's share of the proceeds of pro-
duction, subsequent to the consummation of the loan the world gas
market was in a state of collapse, with the price of natural gas dropping
from approximately $7.00 per mcf at the time the agreement was
executed to $1.53 per mcf as of March, 1989. As a result, one-half
of Marr's share of proceeds of production could never repay more
than a small fraction of the remaining indebtedness. Although the
contract was confected in Texas and the gas that was the subject of
the contract was produced and processed in Mississippi, the parties
agreed that Louisiana law should apply. The agreement was one of
loan, a loan of consumption, which under Louisiana law personally
obligates the borrower to repay the amount, absent express language
to the contrary. In a loan for consumption, "[Tihe borrower is obliged
to restore the thing lent in the same quantity and [quality] .... "4
Marr was obliged to repay the amount of the loan in the time and
manner provided in or .implied by the agreement. The statement in
the agreement that Marr would pay back all money advanced to him
by Shell from half the proceeds of his interest in the three wells did
not clearly create an in rem obligation nor negate the presumption
found in the Louisiana Civil Code that obligors are personally re-
sponsible to perform their obligations. The fact that he could prepay
in cash would indicate, the court said, personal responsibility for the
40. 916 F.2d 1040 (5th Cir. 1990).
41. La. Civ. Code art. 2920.
19921
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW[
loan. To allow Marr to escape repayment of over $4,000,000 would
be unjust enrichment. The provision for repayment out of well proceeds
did nothing more or less than tie in the collateral arrangement with
the primary method and timing for repayment. The court, applying
the doctrine of anticipatory breach, held that Shell's demands for
repayment were not premature. Judgment was rendered in favor of
Shell in the full amount of the money owed. It may be noted that
owing to the wording of the agreement and the fact that the production
would never repay the full amount, the agreement did not spell out
when the loan was to be repaid. Moreover, the payment owed by Marr
to Shell that was being repaid out of the gas was not a purchase of
the gas production.
F. No Unjust Enrichment in Prospect Development
Audubon Exploration developed an oil and gas prospect 4 in Ca-
meron Parish. Linder Oil, the defendant in Audubon Exploration v.
Linder Oil Co.,41 obtained from Liberty Oil a lease on 110 acres of
land in the prospect area and drilled a producing well thereon in 1986.
Audubon claimed that Linder Oil used information that Audubon had
presented to Linder in the Audubon prospect, and Linder thus owed
Audubon an override on the well's production; otherwise, Audubon
asserted, Linder would receive an unjust enrichment. At trial Linder
established that it had earlier received information regarding the pros-
pect area from another source and this information was different from
that of Audubon. The court of appeal could not conclude that the
trial court's determination of this was clearly wrong. The court reviewed
the elements of an unjust enrichment claim. To establish such a-claim,
the moving party must prove the following: 1) There must be an
enrichment; 2) there must be an impoverishment; 3) there must be a
connection between the enrichment and the impoverishment; 4) there
must be an absence of "justification" or "cause" for the enrichment
and impoverishment; and 5) the action will only be allowed when there
is no other remedy at law." The court found that Audubon failed to
establish a connection between the enrichment and the alleged impov-
erishment: Linder's drilling was based upon a prospect independently
developed by another, and there was no proof that Linder used Au-
dubon's geological concepts in any way. Therefore, the court found
42. Oil and gas prospect was defined in the case as "a geological interpretation
of data which delineates or pinpoints a previously undrilled accumulation of oil and
gas which might be exploited." 573 So. 2d 1180. 1180 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1991).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1183, citing Edmonston v. A-Second Mortgage Co. of Slidell, Inc., 289
So. 2d 116, 120 (La. 1974).
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there was no transfer from Audubon's patrimony to Linder Oil's.
Moreover, a legal cause justified the enrichment of Linder Oil since
Linder clearly bought and paid for the geological idea that served as
the basis for its drilling.
V. NATURE OF MINERALS-DEATH AND DIVORCE
A. The Brief Life of Lease Royalty as Separate Property
The case of Hinckley v. Hinckley45 involved a partition of property
in a divorce proceeding. One of the items of appeal concerned the
proper treatment of certain royalties. The husband argued that oil and
gas royalties from mineral leases in Pointe Coupee Parish, which the
wife acquired by donation from her family during the marriage, fell
into the community of acquets and gains because the wife failed to
record in the public records of Pointe Coupee Parish where the property
was located her declaration reserving the royalties as her separate
property. In June, 1980, the wife executed and recorded the declaration
in East Baton Rouge Parish, the matrimonial domicile. At the time
of the declaration, Louisiana Civil Code article 2386 had been sup-
planted by Article 2339, which became effective on January 1, 1980.
A few months later Article 2339 was changed to include royalties
among the fruits that fell into the community, effective September 12,
1980.
Originally Article 2386 provided in pertinent part:
The fruits of the paraphernal property of the wife, wherever
the property be located and however administered, whether
natural, civil, including interest, dividends and rents, or from
the result of labor, fall into the conjugal partnership, if there
exists a community of acquets and gains; unless the wife, by
written instrument, shall declare that she reserves all of such
fruits f6r her own separate use and benefit and her intention
to administer such property separately and alone. The said
instrument shall be executed before a Notary Public and two
witnesses and duly recorded in the Conveyance Records of the
Parish where the community is domiciled.46
On January 1, 1980, the new matrimonial regimes legislation, en-
acted in 1979, came into effect. Article 2339, applicable when the wife
executed and recorded her declaration, read in pertinent part as follows:
The natural and civil fruits of the separate property of a spouse
and bonuses, delay rentals, and shut-in payments arising from
45. 583 So. 2d 125 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991).
46. Id. at 126.
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mineral leases are community property. Nevertheless, a spouse
may reserve them as his separate property by a declaration
made in an authentic act or in an act under private signature
duly acknowledged by the spouses. As to the fruits and proceeds
of immovables, the declaration is effective when filed for reg-
istry in the conveyance records of the parish in which the
immovable property is located. (Act 1979, No. 709, s 1, eff.
Jan. 1, 1980). 41
The amended version of Article 2339, which became effective Sep-
tember 12, 1980, provides in pertinent part:
The natural and civil fruits of the separate property of a
spouse, minerals produced from or attributable to a separate
asset, and bonuses, delay rentals, royalties, and shut-in pay-
ments arising from mineral leases are community property.
Nevertheless, a spouse may reserve them as his separate prop-
erty by a declaration made in an authentic act or in an act
under private signature duly acknowledged.
As to the fruits and revenues of immovables, the declaration
is effective when filed for registry in the conveyance records
of the parish in which the immovable property is located. As
to the fruits of movables, the declaration is effective when
filed for registry in the conveyance records of the parish in
which the declarant is domiciled . 8
Prior to the enactment of Article 2339 in effect from January 1,
1980 until September, 1980, royalties were classified as fruits falling
into the community of acquets and gains. 49 At the time of the dec-
laration, royalties were not classified as fruits in Article 2339. That
article was amended to include royalties as fruits effective September
12, 1980.50 "There was no requirement to record the declaration in
Pointe Coupee Parish where the mineral interests were located in June
of 1980,"'" said the court, to maintain the royalties as separate prop-
erty. Thus, it was held that the mineral royalties were the separate
property of Mrs. Hinckley.
47. Id.
48. La. Civ. Code art. 2339.
49. Milling v. Collector of Revenue, 220 La. 773, 57 So. 2d 679 (1952).
50. Spaht, Matrimonial Regimes, Developments in the Law, 1980-1981, 42 La. L.
Rev. 347, 347 (1982): "The classification of royalties and in kind mineral payments
attributable to separate property from January I, 1980 until September 12, 1980, were
separate property without the necessity of the Article 2339 declaration."
51. 583 So. 2d at 127.
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B. Return of Mineral Proceeds to Succession
The classification of income arising from mineral rights on property
was raised in Succession of Doll v. Doll." The deceased father had
two children. In March, 1978 he conveyed 468 acres to one daughter
for the stated price of $60,000. He died in August of that same year.
The daughter remained in possession of the property until December,
1985, with revenues accruing in that period from rental on houses,
the sale of timber, a subsidy for planting of trees, and bonus money
for the granting of two mineral leases. In December, 1982 another
daughter sought return to the succession of the 468 acres along with
the revenues produced by the property. The court affirmed a trial
court judgment that the revenue from the mineral lease had to be
returned to the succession. The opinion by Judge Hightower discussed
whether mineral rights proceeds are properly to be regarded as products
or as fruits. To classify mineral rights proceeds as fruits instead of
products, said the judge, appears inconsistent with the comments to
Article 551, which article was revised in 1976. However, several pre-
revision" cases and one post-revision case had classified mineral rights
proceeds as fruits.54 Regardless of the proper classification, the result
was the same; even if not characterized as fruits, the mineral lease
payments would be returnable as a resulting diminution of the value
of the immovable. A concurring opinion by the other two judges of
the three judge panel concluded that extracted oil and gas itself would
seem to be a product of the thing under Article 488 and not a fruit
under Article 551. The appeal was only concerned, however, with the
classification of bonus money for the granting of two leases. Lease
bonuses, they said, "should be classified no differently than the rent
paid by the lessee of a pasture or of a building and lot for the privilege
of using the thing leased for a period of time."" Such rent is classified
as a civil fruit by Louisiana Civil Code article 551. Thus they held
that a lease bonus is a civil fruit.
C. When is a Testamentary Usufruct not a Testamentary Usufruct?
There is a distinction in the Civil and Mineral Codes between a
testamentary (or conventional) usufruct and a legal usufruct. According
to the opinion in Darby v. Rozas,16 a line of jurisprudence has treated
52. 577 So. 2d 802 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ granted, 582 So. 2d 845 (1991).
53. Fuselier v. Estate of Peschier, 525 So. 2d 577 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988); Alexander
v. Alexander, 357 So. 2d 1260 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978).
54. Succession of Lindsey, 477 So. 2d 148 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985).
55. 577 So. 2d at 806.
56. 580 So. 2d 984 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991).
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a testamentary usufruct in favor of a surviving spouse as a legal
usufruct rather than as a testamentary usufruct. The Louisiana Third
Circuit Court of Appeal's indication is that to make a testamentary
usufruct have the legal incidents of a testamentary usufruct, the tes-
tament needs to contain provisions inconsistent with the incidents of
a legal usufruct. In other words, the testamentary usufruct will have
the same result as a legal usufruct unless a different treatment is spelled
out in the testament. In this case the testator's will granted his surviving
spouse among other things "the usufruct of all properties owned by
me, movable and immovable, separate and community, including the
usufruct of all royalties and minerals."" If this were a testamentary
usufruct, the usufruct would continue after the remarriage of the
surviving spouse; if this were a legal usufruct, the usufruct would not
continue after her remarriage. The trial court ruled it was a testa-
mentary usufruct which continued. The court of appeal reversed, hold-
ing that it was instead a legal usufruct.
The testator died in April 1986. Under the Mineral Code as it
existed at the death of the testator, the usufruct of land of a surviving
spouse included only the "use and enjoyment of mineral rights as to
mines or quarries actually worked at the time the usufruct was created,"
unless there was a provision "including the use and enjoyment of
mineral rights in a conventional usufruct.""8 Thus, the testator's will
produced a significantly different result for the surviving spouse than
if the surviving spouse had enjoyed only a legal usufruct. Further, the
Mineral Code specifically provided that a "conventional usufruct, in-
cluding one created by a donation inter vivos or mortis causa, may
by express provision include the use and enjoyment of all or a specified
portion of the landowner's rights in minerals." 5 9 Later in 1986, after
the death of the testator, the legislature revised the operation of the
"open mine doctrine" of Mineral Code article 190. Under the amend-
ment, "if a usufruct of land is that of a surviving spouse, whether
legal or conventional, and there is no contrary provision in the in-
strument creating the usufruct, the usufructuary is entitled to the use
and enjoyment of the landowner's rights in minerals, whether or not
mines or quarries were actually worked at the time the usufruct was
created."'' The court in Darby v. Rozas treated this revision as being
retroactive. The court's approach is most questionable, if not patently
absurd. The inquiry it was making was whether the testator's bequest
57. Id. at 985.
58. La. R.S. 31:190 (1989).
59. La. R.S. 31:189 (1989).
60. La. R.S. 31:190(B) (1989).
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was "incompatible with the notion of legal usufruct," 61 such that the
testator was not simply confirming the legal usufruct. The focus was
on the intent of the testator. The issue of impairing vested rights
through a retroactive application of a statute has nothing to do with
whether the intent of the testator was incompatible with the notion
of a legal usufruct at the time the will was made and the usufruct
was created. Clearly the testator had provided for a very different
result under the will than would have occurred under a legal usufruct
at the time the will was made and at the time the usufruct was created.
Clearly, too, the Mineral Code specifically authorized such a testa-
mentary usufruct. The court used a revision of the Mineral Code
designed to expand the benefits of a usufructuary to take away the
benefits granted by the testator to the usufructuary. The logic entirely
escapes this writer.
VI. OIL WELL LIENS
A. Oil Well Liens and Abstractors
Is a title abstractor entitled to a lien under the Louisiana Oil Well
Lien Statute62 for title abstract preparation work on the subject prop-
erty? The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Herbert
Abstract Co. v. Touchstone Properties, Ltd.,6 3 said he was not, in an
affirmation of a district court judgment in favor of the owner of a
working interest in property for which the plaintiff had done title
abstract preparation work. Under Louisiana law, liens and privileges
are to be strictly construed, as they are in derogation of common
rights. They are not to be extended beyond their precise terms by
judicial construction. For recovery under the lien act, the work or
supplies must be directly related to the actual drilling or operation of
an oil, gas or water well. The court ruled that
the nexus between a title abstract preparation and drilling is
too attenuated for this federal court to construe its activity as
being 'in connection with drilling' sufficiently to place it within
the limits of the Louisiana statute. . . . [A] title abstract has
to do with the chain of title to a property. It does not have
anything to do with the actual drilling or operation of any
well or wells or the operation, maintenance or repair of pipe-
lines. 64
61. 580 So. 2d at 987, citing Yiannopoulos, 3 Civil Law Treatise: Personal Servitudes
381 (1989).
62. Louisiana Oil, Gas, and Water Wells Lien Act, La. R.S. 9:4861 (1991).
63. 914 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1990).
64. Id. at 78.
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B. Lien Limited to Amount Filed in Public Record
In Shamsie v. Pyramid Petroleum, Inc.,61 another recent Oil Well
Lien Act case, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal held that
the company's oil well lien for equipment, materials, supplies, and
labor sold and delivered to a petroleum company was limited to the
amount claimed in the lien filed in the public records. Charles Shamsie,
d/b/a Mansfield Pump and Supply, filed in the public records of
Sabine Parish a lien on three wells for equipment, materials, supplies
and labor sold and delivered to defendant, Pyramid Petroleum, Inc.
The amount claimed on the lien, filed on February 17, 1988, was
$4,223.27. On August 11, 1988, the plaintiff filed a petition alleging
that the defendant was indebted to plaintiff for the full sum of $6,328.55,
that sum representing materials, supplies and labor furnished to the
defendant by the plaintiff. The trial court gave judgment for plaintiff
in this amount, together with 10% attorney's fees, legal interest and
costs. On appeal the third circuit amended the judgment to recognize
the plaintiff's lien in the amount of $4,223.27. The court reviewed the
statute which provides that the notice of a privilege shall set forth
"the nature and amount thereof,"" and case law stating that the
purpose of the filing of the claim is to "apprise third persons of the
kind of a lien which is claimed, what property is affected, and to fix
the limit of the claim so that no more can be claimed. ' 67 The court
rejected the contention that the suit is in the nature of an open account.
The plaintiff's "Petition Exercising Lien" with attached copy of the
lien document filed in the public records, made it clear that the
plaintiff's intention was to have an oil well privilege recognized.
VII. PRESCRIPTION OF MINERAL SERVITUDE
A. Prescription Not Interrupted by Acts of Owners of Separately
Owned Mineral Rights
The case of Horton v. Mobley," involved numerous' parties in a
dispute about the continued existence of certain mineral servitude rights
in tracts of land. On December 1, 1925 the Estate of S.S. Hunter,
Inc. (hereafter "A") sold to "B" and "C" a 565-acre tract of land
located in Bossier Parish. In this conveyance, "A" retained certain
mineral rights under the following clause which reserved:
65. 577 So. 2d 835 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991).
66. La. R.S. 9:4862 (1991).
67. 577 So. 2d at 837, quoting Mercantile Nat'l Bank of Dallas v. J. Thos. Driscoll,
Inc., 194 La. 935, 950, 195 So. 497, 502 (1940).
68. 578 So. 2d 977 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 582 So. 2d 1310 (1991).
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three-fourths (3/4) of all of the minerals in and under the
property, which ["A"] specifically reserves, and [he] likewise
retains all oil and gas wells on the property, consisting now
of two (2) oil and two (2) gas wells owned by The Palmer
Corporation and two (2) oil and two (2) gas wells owned by
["A"] and one (I) gas well owned by the Gulf Refining Com-
pany of Louisiana, the production ... and all income from
which is retained by ["A"J.69
"C" died in 1943. On May 23, 1944, the "C" heirs and "B"
voluntarily partitioned the land and mineral interests they acquired
from "A". In the partition, the "C" heirs received approximately 556
acres (the "C" property), and "B" received the remaining nine acres.
Additionally, each party expressly and separately reserved "all of the
mineral rights in the [other's property] ... which they owned prior
to the execution of this transfer." 7
0
At issue in the case was the nature of the mineral rights reserved
by "A" in 1925 and those reserved by "B" in 1944 and the continued
viability of "B's mineral rights. The court of appeal affirmed a
summary judgment granted to the defendants, holding that the plain-
tiffs' rights had terminated due to prescription. The court held that
"A" clearly intended to and did reserve a 75% interest in the right
to explore for minerals on the entire tract, 100% of the production,
and 100% of the income from the reserved wells in a single mineral
servitude that also included the right to continue to receive all pro-
duction and income from the pre-1925 wells. After the 1925 sale, "B"
and "C" owned 100% of the former "A" tract surface in indivision
plus an undivided one-quarter interest in the minerals in and under
the property. Their interests, however, were subject to "A' s mineral
servitude. Neither "B" nor "C" derived their right to explore for
minerals by virtue of the "A" servitude as far as the nine existing
"A" wells were concerned. They became the landowners and succeeded
to a fractional interest in the right to explore for minerals as a whole.
They each had the right to enter the land, drill for oil and gas and
reduce it to possession, subject to their obligation to account to "A"
for 75% of the mineral proceeds. "B" and "C" were not co-owners
of a right with "A." When "B" and "C" partitioned their property
in 1944, they created additional mineral servitudes on the land, but
such servitudes were not co-owned with "A." Instead, they were sep-
arate servitudes. The owners of separate mineral servitudes are not co-
69. Id. at 980.
70. Id.
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owners of each other's mineral servitude." In effect, "B" as a co-
owner of the land, reserved in the partition one or more mineral
servitudes, each consisting of an undivided one-eighth (1/8) mineral
servitude affecting each noncontiguous tract of the "C" property,
subject to "A's 1000 interest in the pre-1925 wells and his right to
explore for 75o of the minerals. Neither "B" nor "C" was'a co-
owner of "A's mineral servitude, particularly insofar as the "A"
wells were concerned. Thus, production from the wells as to which he
had exclusive rights did not interrupt prescription as to their mineral
servitudes that resulted from the 1944 partition. There was no indication
in the record of any drilling or production during the period 1944 to
1954 which would prevent prescription from accruing. The court re-
jected a contention by plaintiffs that even if "A" received all income
and production by agreement, the act of production constituted a use
by user sufficient to interrupt prescription on "B's servitude. There
was no evidence that a co-ownership relationship may have existed
between "A" and the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs' continued receipt of production proceeds on wells
drilled after May 23, 1954 and the 35-year delay in asserting prescription
neither prevented prescription from accruing nor otherwise extended
the ten-year period. Subsequent drilling by the "C' heirs or their
lessees following accrual of prescription could not "revive,'" "resur-
rect" or otherwise extend "B's mineral servitude, which terminated
as a matter of law for nonuse on May 23, 1954.
VIII. PROCEDURE
A. Res Judicata
Nerco invoked a concursus proceeding, Nerco Oil & Gas, Inc. v.
Johnson,'2 upon being notified that the Johnsons were claiming the
proceeds of various mineral interests adverse to the claims of certain
persons referred to in the litigation as the Beason Group. The same
mineral interests had been the subject of litigation in 1970 that had
been settled. The claims of the Johnsons had been adjudicated in that
litigation, but now the Johnsons asserted that their claims were founded
on a different cause of action in that they were demanding not an
adjudication of ownership of the royalty interest but entitlement to
71. Starr Davis Oil Co. v. Webber, 218 La. 231, 48 So. 2d 906 (1950); Long-Bell
Petroleum Co. v. Tritico, 216 La. 426, 43 So. 2d 782 (1949); Clark v. Tensas Delta
Land Co., 172 La. 913, 136 So. 1 (1931); Steele v. Denning, 445 So. 2d 94 (La. App.
2d Cir.), aff'd, 456 So. 2d 992 (1984); La. Min. Code arts. 24 and 169.
72. 577 So. 2d 1224 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 581 So. 2d 692 (1991).
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the proceeds of the settlement agreement. The court stated: "[W]e fail
to see how the right to the proceeds of those mineral interests can be
separated from the ownership of the interests themselves. The facts
required to establish each are the same.""' Thus, the principle of res
judicata barred raising claims that were or should have been adjudicated
in the earlier litigation.
B. Venue for Outer Continental Shelf Litigation
In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. OKC Ltd. Partnership,7' a suit for
cancellation of an oil and gas sublease was filed in the coastal parish
nearest the offshore area where the subject tract was located. The trial
court overruled defendant's declinatory exception of improper venue.
The court relied on Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 80,
which provides that an action to assert an interest in immovable prop-
erty, or a right in, to, or against immovable property shall be brought
in the parish where the immovable property is situated. The court of
appeal reversed, sustaining the exception and transferring the action
to Orleans Parish where the defendant's agent for service of process
was located. The court ruled that venue exceptions are in derogation
of a common right and must be strictly construed; the party claiming
the benefit of an exception must bring itself clearly within the exception.
Strictly construing the venue exception contained in Article 80, the
court stated that any immovable property located beyond the gulfward
boundary of Louisiana and of her coastal parishes is not situated in
a coastal parish.
C. Tax Sale Validity
Seneca Resources initiated a concursus proceeding in Seneca Re-
sources Corp. v. Delacroix Corp." to determine ownership of property
for purposes of 'distributing funds gained through mineral leases. At
issue was the validity of the sale of the subject property on June 22,
1912 for nonpayment of 1911 taxes. The fourth circuit ruled that in
light of the adequate property description in the St. Bernard Voice,
both in 1912 and in 1913, and in light of the fact that the defendant
claimant took no action to recover the property for more than seventy
years after it received actual notice of its delinquency of taxes and of
the pending sale, the trial court's finding that the claimant's claims
had prescribed did not violate any standard set forth in the United
States Supreme Court opinion in Mennonite Board of Missions v.
73. Id. at 1226.
74. 582 So. 2d 351 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991).
75. 573 So. 2d 1244 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991).
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Adams.76 There was no error in the trial court's finding that defendant's
claims had prescribed and that the 1912 tax sale was not a nullity.
IX. TORTS
A. Sublease of Farming Land
The liability of a sublessor of farming property to a sublessee for
damages caused by the drilling operations of a mineral lessee acting
pursuant to a lease recorded prior to the sublease was at issue in
Comb v. Dugas.7' The defendant, Dugas, had taken a ten-year surface
lease from the Stuarts for farming purposes in 1975 subject to a
reservation of all rights to conduct oil and gas exploration activities
on the land. The Stuarts then granted a mineral lease to Lyons Pe-
troleum in 1982. The mineral lease provided that "[ihe Lessee shall
be responsible for all damages caused by Lessee's operations." After
it was recorded, Dugas subleased the land to plaintiffs, the Combs,
for farming operations; Dugas was to receive one-fifth of all crops as
the consideration. The plaintiffs were informed that drilling activities
might be conducted on the property. In 1985 Lyons conducted oper-
ations on the property that caused damage to the plaintiffs' crops.
Dugas brought suit against Lyons and settled after receiving one-fifth
of the alleged damages occasioned by Lyons' activities. The Combs
brought suit against Dugas, claiming a breach of warranty of peaceable
possession, apparently after releasing Lyons from liability for an un-
disclosed consideration. The trial court concluded that at the time of
the oral sublease the sublessees were sufficiently notified by Dugas of
the possibility that oil and gas drilling operations might be conducted
on the property sub-let. The sublessees' knowledge that oil exploration
activities would occur on the property in question was sufficient to
deny them damages under a theory of breach of peaceable possession.78
The court of appeal affirmed the judgment, stating that
when the oral sublease was confected, the warranty of peaceable
possession was limited or modified such that the sublessee's
rights to the property were taken subject to the landowner
and/or its mineral lessee's prior right to conduct mineral op-
erations on the property, subject only to the sublessee's right
76. 462 U.S. 791, 103 S. Ct. 2706 (1983).
77. 576 So. 2d 1130 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991).
78. The trial court observed that the plaintiffs could have and may indeed have
sought compensation for damages from Lyons by virtue of the stipulation pour autrui
contained within the Lyons' oil and gas lease; see Andrepont v. Acadia Drilling Co.,
255 La. 347, 231 So. 2d 347 (1969).
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to seek reimbursement for damages from the mineral lessee. 9
B. Damages for Obstruction of Use of Land by Servitude Owner
The decision in Corley v. Craf 0 is another decision growing out
of the facts established in an earlier case of the same name.' There,
the court held that the actions of the landowners, the Crafts, created
a legal obstacle to the lessee/plaintiff's use of a mineral servitude. In
this proceeding the plaintiff sought damages for the actions of the
defendants. The trial court awarded damages in the amount of $7238.93.
The defendants claimed that the plaintiff had no right against them
because a third party had advanced the money expended as a result
of the obstacle; moreover, one of the defendants had divorced the
other, and the ex-wife claimed she had no involvement in creating the
obstacle and thus should have no liability. The appellate court ruled
that as the mineral lessee, plaintiff owned the right to drill upon the
property and the right to drill the well in question, which drilling was
obstructed by defendants. Because defendants interfered with plaintiff's
rights granted to it under the mineral lease, plaintiff was entitled to
recover damages from defendants. The fact that money expended by
plaintiff was derived from an agreement with a third person was of
no consequence and was irrelevant to the issue of the right to recover
those expenses. The liability of the wife was determined in the prior
litigation, and, in any event, the property was presumed to be com-
munity property.
X. CONSERVATION MATTERS
A. Unit Well Costs
In Davis Oil Co. v. Steamboat Petroleum Co.,8" the Louisiana
Supreme Court reversed a Louisiana court of appeal decision that had
extended the approach of Superior Oil v. Humble Oil & Refining"3 to
hold that when a non-operator participated in a Commissioner's pro-
ceeding applied for by an operator of a well, the non-operator became
liable for a share of well costs even if the well resulted in a dry hole
and even if the Commissioner did not adopt a counterplan proposed
79. 576 So. 2d at 1132.
80. 571 So. 2d 718 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1990).
81. Corley v. Craft, 501 So. 2d 1049 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 503 So. 2d
18 (1987).
82. 583 So. 2d 1139 (La. 1991), rev'g, 570 So. 2d 495 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1990).
83. 165 So. 2d 905 (La. App. 4th Cir.). writ denied, 246 La. 842. 167 So. 2d 668
(1964).
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by the nonoperator. The court observed that it is difficult to balance
the rights of the operator and the non-operating parties in a unit.8
The Louisiana high court applied by analogy the Mineral Code precepts
regarding co-ownership of land or mineral interests to rights in a drilling
unit,s and concluded that a non-operating owner or lessee who does
not consent to operations by a unit operator within a compulsory
drilling unit has no liability for the costs of development except out
of his share of production. The court distinguished Superior Oil v.
Humble Oil & Refining on the basis that in that case Humble had
initiated the unit proceeding. It should be noted that Act No. 345 of
1984 did not become applicable until after the effective date of the
unit order at issue in the Davis Oil Co. v. Steamboat Petroleum Co.
case.86
B. Exhaustion Required on Well Plugging; Primary Jurisdiction not
Applied on Property Remediation (Clean up)
In Magnolia Coal Terminal v. Phillips Oil Co.," the case, based
on a claim by Magnolia for damages arising from a well alleged to
be leaking, went forward in the trial court despite an assertion by the
defendant that the Commissioner of Conservation had exclusive juris-
diction over leaking wells. The trial court found that the well had not
been plugged properly and awarded damages for plugging the well and
for remediation of the property. At the same time, a proceeding
initiated by the defendant Phillips was going on before the Commis-
sioner of Conservation, and the Commissioner concluded that the well
was not leaking."8 The trial court and the Commissioner of Conser-
vation thus made findings of fact that were in direct contradiction of
one another. The court of appeal reversed the district court's damage
award in its entirety, holding that the judgment of the trial court was
84. See I B. Kramer & P. Martin, Pooling and Unitization, § 12.01 (1991); Kramer,
Compulsory Pooling and Unitization: State Options in Dealing with Uncooperative
Owners, 7 J. Energy L. & Pol'y 255 (1986).
85. La. R.S. 31:168 (1989), La. R.S. 31:174-178 (1989). McNamara, Unitized Pro-
duction-Rights of Operators and Non-operators, 31 La. Min. L. Inst. 194 (1984);
McCollam, Legal Relations Among Parties to Compulsory Units, 15 La. Min. L. Inst.
69 (1968).
86. See also Jorden, Forced Pooling in Louisiana-Recent Orders and Cases, 42
Sw. Legal Fdn. Oil & Gas Inst., Ch. 11 (1991); Jorden, Well Cost Adjustments, 38th
La. Min. L. Inst. -. (1991).
87. 576 So. 2d 475 (La. 1991). The author was on the brief of this case in the
Louisiana Supreme Court.
88. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Batchelor, 560 So. 2d 461 (La. App. Ist Cir.
1990). The well operator sought a review of the Commissioner's determination, but the
court of appeal dismissed the case since it was clear that Phillips was seeking to confirm
the order, not challenge it, and thus the case presented no justiciable controversy.
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based on factual issues that fell within the exclusive province of the
Commissioner of Conservation. 9 The Louisiana Supreme Court, in an
opinion signed by two justices with five other justices writing concurring
or dissenting opinions, affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.
The supreme court affirmed the court of appeal insofar as it held that
Magnolia had no cause of action to force proper plugging and aban-
donment of the oil well until the matter had been reconsidered by the
Commissioner of Conservation, but it reversed on the question of
damages. A per curiam opinion that accompanied the supreme court's
denial of rehearing stated that the trial court in deciding the issue of
remediation of the property did not abuse its discretion by refusing
to defer to the Commissioner of Conservation as a matter of primary
jurisdiction. In 1990 the Louisiana legislature enacted a statute expressly
providing that the Commissioner of Conservation has jurisdiction over
well site remediation.9
It may be observed that while the court of appeal decision was
grounded on the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies as to
well plugging as well as on the doctrine of primary jurisdiction (though
not so denominated by the court) as to seeking the expertise of the
Commissioner of Conservation regarding whether the well was leaking
and remediation, the supreme court in its per curiam opinion neither
accepted nor rejected the existence of the primary jurisdiction doctrine
in Louisiana law." The court stated the following, which seems to
contain the premise that a court could well apply the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction in an appropriate exercise of discretion and that
89. 561 So. 2d 732 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990).
90. Act 192 of 1990 amended La. R.S. 30:4(C)(1) and (16)(a) and 4.1(B)(1) relative
to the authority of the Commissioner of Conservation regarding dry and abandoned
wells. It provides for closure of pits, removal of equipment, structures, and trash, and
general site cleanup of dry or abandoned wells and provides for a bond to secure such
cleanup.
91. See O'Meara v. Union Oil Co. of California,' 212 La. 745, 33 So. 2d 506
(1947): Some years ago Professor Dakin, relying on O'Meara, indicated that.Louisiana
law was congenial to the application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine. He has stated
"The [primary jurisdiction] idea would seem to have validity in our state practice as
well (referring to the United States Supreme Court decision in Carnation Co. v. Pacific
Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213, 86 S. Ct. 781 (1966)] where a suit for damages
or an accounting as to which a state district court clearly has primary and possibly
exclusive jurisdiction, nonetheless involves issues which are at least within the competence
and possibly within the exclusive primary jurisdiction of the Conservation Commis-
sioner." Dakin, Exclusive and Primary Jurisdiction Under the Louisiana Conservation
Act, 18 La. Min. L. Inst. 59, 63 (1968). He concluded by observing "Court readiness
to defer to agency competence in fact findings and interpretation related to agency
orders combined with a readiness to stay court proceedings pending such referrals would
comport with the promise and philosophy of the O'Meara case of twenty-five years
ago." Id. at 69.
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in some circumstances it would be an abuse of discretion not to apply
it:
The deference to administrative agencies for an initial decision
on matters within the expertise of the agency, which is con-
templated by the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, is a matter
within the sound discretion of the trial court. In the present
case the trial court, in deciding the remediation issue, did not
abuse its discretion by refusing to defer to the Commissioner
of Conservation as a matter of primary jurisdiction. 92
92. 576 So. 2d at 489.
